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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
CCD, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company, d/b/a/ UNITED TITLE
SERVICES OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 20020875-SC

v.
CHRISTOPHER LYNN MILLSAP, an
individual,
Defendant-Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant, Christopher Lynn Millsap ("Millsap"), by and through his attorneys,
hereby replies to the Brief of Appellee CCD ("CCD Brief), filed with this Court on
September 9, 2003. Using Millsap's initial Brief of Appellant as an organizational guide
to the arguments before this Court, Millsap submits the following. In doing so, Millsap
reasserts the points and authorities presented in the initial brief and does not waive any
arguments set forth therein.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING
THE UTAH REVISED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
ACT IN EXPELLING MILLSAP.

In its response, Appellee CCD ("CCD") argues that the trial court correctly
interpreted the Utah Revised Limited Liability Act ("the Act"), and more specifically
Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-710 ("the expulsion provision"), in expelling Millsap as a
Member of CCD. See CCD Brief at 31. As support, CCD reasons that: 1) principles of
statutory construction and legislative intent authorize CCD to expel Millsap under the

facts of this case, see id. at 31-39; 2) the "timing" of Millsap's retirement and CCD's
filing for expulsion is irrelevant, see id. at 40-41; and 3) the Act's expulsion provision
trumped CCD's operating agreement, see id. at 42-43. For the following reasons, CCD's
arguments should be rejected and this Court should find that because Millsap was not a
"member"of CCD at the time of the judicial determination of expulsion, Millsap could
not be "expelled" within the meaning of the Act.
A.

Principles Of Statutory Construction Do Not
Authorize Expulsion In This Case Under
The Plain Language Of The Act.

Foundational principles of statutory construction do not authorize CCD to expel
Millsap under the facts of this case. Here, CCD wishes to ignore the plain language of the
expulsion provision. Indeed, CCD relies on the proposition that "when doubt or
uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions," then an
statute is analyzed in accordance with legislative intent. See CCD Brief at 32 (emphasis
added). In doing so, CCD contends that Millsap's reading of the statute is "hypertechnical" and will result in an interpretation that contradicts the express purpose of
legislature. See id. at 32-33.
However, Millsap's reading of the expulsion provision is not "hyper-technical,"
nor is the expulsion provision ambiguous.1 In fact, the expulsion provision could not be

'Instead, this Court "must assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly"
and as such, "the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable." See Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 61 P.3d 1053,
1058 (Utah 2002); State v. Bluff, 52 P.3d 1210, 1221 (Utah 2002); Davis County v. Zions
First Natl Bank, 51 P.3d 718, 721 (Utah App. 2002). Nor may a court "rewrite the
statute to conform to an intention not expressed." American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 63
2
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acting in bad-faith should not be allowed to simply cut off a member's rights by mere
application.3
B.

Expulsion Does Not Occur Automatically
At The Moment Of A Wrongdoing.

CCD further argues that Millsap "quibbles" with the trial court's oral finding that
expulsion became effective the moment Millsap committed his wrongful acts. See CCD
Brief at 40. In a footnote, CCD speculates that what the trial court "probably intended" is
that Millsap lost his right to enforce the terms of the Operating Agreement and
Amendment immediately upon commission of wrongful acts. See CCD Brief at 40, n.5.
Under either scenario, CCD assumes that "expulsion" or the "losing of the right to
enforce a contract" occurs instantaneously and is self-activating without any, or despite
any, action by another. Such assumption is simply not true. For example, upon Millsap's
wrongdoing, an act for "expulsion" had to be initiated by someone-either the Members
saying "you are expelled," or the Members applying for a judicial determination.
Further, CCD's theory that one is expelled or loses the right to enforce a contract
the moment a wrongdoing occurs is not practical. While it might seem equitable in this
case due to the nature and scope Millsap's admitted criminal wrongdoing, the general and
overbroad proposition is an invitation for constant battle between members, with courts
left to sort out the effect of one member proclaiming to the other that they are expelled.
Indeed, there needs to be some independent determination or action in order to decide
what remedy the wrongdoing warrants and what rights, if any, are lost.
3

See further discussion in Subsection D below.
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C.

The Trial Court's Ruling And CCD's Interpretation
Of The Act Is Contrary To Expressed Legislative Intent.

"contract a\\a>"" ihc right t< expel. Set Brief of Appellant at " IK \ 24 i citing I tah Code
Ann §48-2c-120(f)). Millsap has asserted, however, u^i iiiv uiu. cOui; ^ idling regarding
!h • I mi in U P o t ' l l i f r \ |) 11 III", ni o n "ir , n i i l i . i i ' ' In I

ImsI'iUre'

uiai

the Act "be interpreted so as to give the maximum, effect to the principle of freedom of
contract and to the enforceability of operating agreements of ccmpai.., > n;u
MV-

•

•

•*

)•

While the provision of the CCD Operating Agreement precluding expulsion is i lot
strictly enforceable, it is evidence ol the intent ul Ihe diiillei* nl Ihc dwuitnuil, .unl \\ In n
ir.nl in 'Vinbiiulinii \" ilh ihr « nliir Operating -\i:roemrnt, there can be no argument
regarding the intentions and effect of the agreement. The d» 'cument prov ides ' \ *- u u*
of tl le agreement rendu.^ I,,v w^-^.^i ,

•„ .;. Jie compam
5

:

see Operating Agreement at % 7(e); 2) Regardless of any breach, a member is empowered
to retire at any time for any reason, see Operating Agreement at TJ12 ; and 3) upon
retirement, a Member is to be paid for his share, with payments allowed over a period of
20 years, regardless of the effect on the company and regardless of any prior breach of the
agreement, see Operating Agreement at \ \ 12-14.
The issues now before this Court concern both legislative as well as member
intent. The legislature clearly gave the Members of CCD the freedom to structure the
company in the manner that they seemed appropriate. The legislature has also mandated
that the Member's intent, as reflected in the Operating Agreement, be given the maximum
effect by this Court. The trial court ruling simply ignores the clear intentions of the
drafting Members and eviscerates the freedom to contract and deal with problems
internally.
Moreover, despite Millsap's view that the Act is clear and the plain language of
the expulsion provision takes precedence, CCD continues to assert that the intent of the
legislature could never be to allow a person who committed the wrongdoing Millsap
admittedly did to retain rights as a member. See CCD Brief at 38-39. In doing so, CCD
and its Members continually point out that Millsap misappropriated a large sum of money
from the company. See e.g., CCD Brief at 21, 23, 28, 36. CCD argues that it must have
been the intent of the legislature, upon such wrongdoing, to immediately nullify any
ownership rights Millsap had in the corporation he helped build and make successful. See
CCD Brief at 37. CCD then runs this Court through a "parade of horribles" if Millsap's
argument is accepted and states:
6

If Millsap's argument is accepted, any member whose acts
constitute grounds for expulsion under the Act could avoid
the remedy by voluntarily withdrawing to escape being
relegated to the status of an assignee.. .Interpreting the Act in
such a way that allows a member's alleged voluntary
retirement to trump a company's right to seek expulsion guts
Section 48-2c-710, making the right to expel a member
meaningless.
CCD Brief at 38-39.
To the contrary, members forming an LLC have the ability to structure their
company in a way that eliminates every result presented by this case or the imagination of
counsel for the Plaintiff. CCD's drafters chose to take a specific route in their dealings
with one another, and if we are to give deference to "member intent" as well as the
"legislative intent," then the intent as expressed in the CCD Operating Agreement cannot
be ignored. The "parade of horribles" CCD sets forth is easily remedied through
operating agreements, and CCD's predicted results are easily avoided by drafting an
operating agreement that does not provide a right to retire4 or one which gives members
the ability to expel a breaching member by a majority vote.5 Although CCD claims that
Millsap's interpretation "guts" the expulsion provision, the opposite is true: CCD's
interpretation guts the whole intent of the Act to allow freedom of contract.
Beyond that, if this Court orders that both the intention of the drafters as well as

4

Since, if there is no specified right to retire in an operating agreement, the default
provision of the Act is enforced which provides that a member may not voluntarily
withdraw absent the approval of the other members. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-709.
5

Since the expulsion provision also provides that a member of a company may be
expelled "as provided in the company's operating agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c710(1).
7

the legislature be followed, no unfair result will follow. Millsap has never argued that he
is not responsible for any damage caused to CCD. But, despite the persistence of CCD,
the damage to the company is not what is at issue before this Court. The issue is whether
Millsap retains his profit share rights to the company. Any damage to CCD or its
Members will appropriately be subtracted from Millsap's share of the company and CCD
will absolutely be compensated.
D.

The Expulsion Provision Should Not
Be Wielded In Bad Faith.

Millsap has shown that CCD now seeks expulsion in bad faith in order to eliminate
his profit share and to increase the profit share of the remaining two CCD Members. See
Brief of Appellant at 10-11, 26-28. CCD counters that such is not the case. See CCD
Brief at 45-48. The chronology of this case reveals differently.
Upon Millsap's acknowledgment of misappropriation of funds, a new agreement
was created which provided that Newman would lend Millsap $493,965. As security,
Millsap granted Newman all of his interest in CCD. Millsap worked diligently and the
money was repaid in a timely fashion.
In October of 2000, after the money was repaid, there were only three people that
were aware of Millsap's defalcation-the three Members of CCD. Perhaps most
importantly, all had agreed that law enforcement would not be told of the clearly
criminal acts by Millsap. On October 25, 2000, a special meeting was held to determine
what Millsap would be paid for his share of the company. The minutes acknowledge that
a "quiet parting of ways" was discussed. CCD feigns indignation at the assertion that this
8

discussion involved a threat that if Millsap did not agree to leave his share of the
company behind for a nominal fee, then the parting of ways would be anything but quiet
and authorities would be notified. CCD offers no explanation for why this "parting of
ways" would otherwise need to be quiet. CCD offers no rebuttal to the fact that Millsap
did not sell his interest and instead walked into the authorities on his own accord two
months after the meeting. There is simply nothing else that "a quiet parting of ways"
could mean in this context, and the record reveals that the other Members did threaten
Millsap and Millsap called their bluff.
During the next year there was absolutely no attempt to expel Millsap. Eleven
months later in September of 2001, all of the conditions precedent to Millsap's
reinstatement as a Member of CCD had occurred. Notably, Millsap had not been
physically present at the business and had not requested anything from the company for at
least a year. However, in anticipation of his retirement as a Member of CCD, and also in
anticipation to the end of the one year waiting period required for the reinstatement of his
rights, Millsap sent correspondence to the company requesting an appraisal of his interest
in CCD. Immediately thereafter, CCD raced to the courthouse and filed a complaint
against Millsap, including a claim for Millsap's expulsion from the company. Such
expulsion would effectively cut off Millsap's profit-share interest in the company which
he has a right to in retirement.
CCD asserts that what it and its Members are simply doing is trying to save the
company and prohibit Millsap's continued participation in CCD's business. See CCD
Brief at 48. To the contrary, if that had been the true motive, such action for expulsion
9

would have occurred when Millsap was actually present and involved in the daily affairs
of the company. The reality of the situation is that CCD and its Members attempted on
two prior occasions to obtain Millsap's share of the company. First, the Members set up
the amended agreement so that if Millsap did not immediately repay the funds he
misused, he would lose his interest in the company. When he surprisingly met those
conditions, CCD and its Members had to find another way to shut Millsap out. Second,
the Members attempted to coerce Millsap into leaving through threats of reporting him to
authorities. Again, he foiled the Members' plan and reported himself.
Subsequently, on September 28, 2002, after Millsap notified the other Members
that he intended to retire, CCD found another way to obtain his rights and filed a
complaint for expulsion. This Court, however, should not allow the expulsion provision
to be used in such a manner.
E.

CCD Distorts The Underlying Financial
Realities Of The Case.

In their response to this Court and in argument to the trial court, CCD argues the
perceived injustice of not expelling a member that has committed serious violations of
law. There is, however, no actual injustice and CCD's arguments are premised upon a
distorted version of the financial realities of this case.
First, CCD asserts that Millsap seeks to destroy the company and dissolve it. See
CCD Brief at 39, 48. While Millsap does seek proper compensation for his interest in the
company, the Operating Agreement provides that such compensation may be paid "in
annual installments for a period of not less than five years nor greater than twenty years
10

or upon such other terms and conditions as are mutually acceptable to the parties or their
representatives." See Operating Agreement, ^| 15. Millsap's interest can be purchased by
either the company or the remaining Members. See id. at Tf 12. Therefore, CCD or any of
its Members will have at least twenty years to pay for Millsap's interest, and possibly
more through a negotiated agreement. Such clearly does not require dissolution.
Further, insofar as Millsap's misappropriation has harmed CCD, Millsap is
undeniably obligated to pay for what that wrongful conduct caused. However, the
characterization that CCD would be automatically dissolved and destroyed is simply
misleading. In reality, rather than seeking a windfall, Millsap is merely seeking
compensation for what his share of the company is worth minus any damage he caused.
CCD additionally maintains that Millsap, as an assignee, has not lost any financial
share of the company. CCD reasons that Millsap's expulsion does not provide any
financial benefit to the other Members because he still owns one-third of the company as
an assignee. See CCD Brief at 46. The reality is that as an assignee, Millsap is only
entitled to profit distributions "to the extent assigned" by the members. See Utah Code
Ann. § 48-2c-l 102. For all practical purposes, the other members have the ability to
continue making distributions to themselves as "salary" rather than "profit" in order to
shut the assignee completely out. As such, "expulsion" does more than prevent Millsap's
participation in the business, it effectively eliminates his right to a profit share in the
business. Indeed, if CCD and its Members were acting in good faith, why do they need
"expulsion" if he has already been gone for a year and has not participated in the
management of the company?
11

Finally, CCD argues that if Millsap is not expelled, he is escaping responsibility
for his thefts. Both the Operating Agreement and the order of restitution of the criminal
court hold him fully accountable for what his actions cost the company. See Operating
Agreement at \ 7(e). The question is not whether he should pay for his breach, but rather,
what happens to his profit share of the company after his breach is deducted? Stated
another way, did Millsap lose his right to that remainder as a result of his wrongful
conduct? The unambiguous answer to that question is found in the terms of the Operating
Agreement, and the answer is no.
II.

CCD AND ITS MEMBERS WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO
EXPEL MILLSAP AND REFUSE PERFORMANCE OF
THE OPERATING AGREEMENT AND AMENDMENT.
A.

CCD Waived Any Right To Expel.

CCD never disputes the general proposition that a corporation may waive the right
to expel. See Brief of Appellant at 29. Instead, CCD asserts that it did not intentionally
waive its expulsion right. See CCD Brief at 28. CCD admits that even though Millsap
committed wrongdoing, he was given a second chance. See id. CCD goes on to explain,
however, that Millsap again wronged the corporation, and upon that discovery, Millsap
was terminated (but not expelled) from the company. See id. at 28, 30-31. Termination,
as opposed to expulsion, was a clear and knowing choice made by CCD and its Members.
Importantly, it was not until September 28, 2001, over one year later at a time where
Millsap had since repaid all monies, had taken criminal responsibility for his wrongs, had
met the three material conditions in fulfilling the amendment to the Operating Agreement,
and had given notice of his intent to voluntarily withdraw from the company, that CCD
12

then sought expulsion in an effort to cut Millsap off from any remaining rights he held in
the corporation. Despite CCD's contentions, CCD had the option to seek expulsion at
several points throughout this scenario. Instead of doing so, CCD knowingly allowed
Millsap to remedy his wrongdoing through other means-namely entering into the
amended agreement, his termination from the company, and his absolute and rapid
repayment of misused funds. Only when Millsap did everything asked of him did CCD
then seek expulsion. Millsap maintains, however, that expulsion at this point is simply too
late.
B.

CCD Waived Its Right To Refuse Performance
Based On The "First Breach Rule."
1.

Millsap has the right to enforce the terms of the
Operating Agreement and the Amendment.

CCD continues to argue that the trial court made findings that Millsap breached
both the Operating Agreement and the Amendment to the Operating Agreement. See
CCD Brief at 20. More specifically, the written findings adopted from those prepared by
CCD state that Millsap's endorsing of checks drawn upon the trust account constituted a
breach of the amendment. See R. 589 (finding of fact ^ 5).6 Accordingly, CCD maintains
that Millsap's continued use of the trust account constituted material breaches of the
Amendment, and thus, Millsap had no right of retirement. See CCD Brief at 21-24.

6

CCD misstates the trial court's written finding as "Millsap's manipulations of the
Trust account for his personal use after the Amendment was signed constituted material
breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement that materially and adversely affected
CCD." CCD Brief at 20.
13

CCD also asserts that Millsap "attempts to manufacture" an issue of fact regarding
the breach of the Amendment when Millsap presented an additional affidavit to the trial
court7 indicating the Members knew that Millsap continued to endorse checks on the
account and that the practicalities of the business required it. See CCD Brief at 20, 24-27.
For the following reasons, CCD errs.
a.

Millsap has not "manufactured facts"
and the supplemental affidavit was
properly presented to the trial court.

As noted in initial briefing, the finding of a material breach of the Amendment to
the Operating Agreement does not comport with the oral ruling of the district court nor
the court's reasoning during the hearing on the motion. See Brief of Appellant at 35. After
receiving CCD's proposed findings, Millsap timely objected, moved the district court to
reconsider its ruling, requested further hearing, and provided a supplemental affidavit in
order to meet the proposed finding regarding the alleged breach of the amendment that
seemingly came from nowhere. See R. 522-533. This "motion to reconsider" and
supplemental affidavit were submitted prior to any signing of a final order, and therefore,
such submission was entirely proper. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah
1978) (ff[T]he law is well settled in the state that the statements made by a trial judge are
not the judgment of the case and it is only the signed judgment that prevails").
Importantly, "[t]rial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change their
position with respect to any orders or decisions as long as no final judgment has been
7

At no time during district court proceedings did CCD move to strike the affidavit.
14

rendered." Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, 973. (Utah 2002).
Thus, such submissions made by Millsap were appropriate since Millsap was faced with a
proposed finding drafted by CCD which did not comport with the trial court's analysis,
and Millsap wished to provide additional evidence surrounding that proposed finding
since such issue had not been adequately argued. See e.g., Ron Shepherd Insurance, Inc.,
v Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n.4 (Utah 1994) (where judge never signed order granting
motion for summary judgment, the "motion for reconsideration" was, in essence, not a
motion for reconsideration at all, but simply reargument of opposition to motion for
summary judgment, which a trial court is free to entertain at any point prior to entry of a
final order or judgment); U.P.C. Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 958-959
(Utah App. 1999) ( motion to reconsider appropriate where litigant seeks to show: 1)
matter presented in different light; 2) there has been change in governing law; 3) the party
offers new evidence; 4) manifest injustice will result if court does not reconsider ruling;
5) a court needs to correct own errors; or 6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first
contemplated by court),
Therefore, despite the contentions of CCD otherwise, Millsap's additional affidavit
was properly before the trial court, was considered in the trial court's ruling denying the
motion to reconsider, and is now properly part of the record before this Court.
Jx

CCD waived any alleged right to refuse
performance of the Amendment to the
Operating Agreement.

The Amendment to the Operating Agreement very clearly provides that Millsap's
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membership rights were to be reinstated upon completion of three conditions
precedent: the repayment of the Newman Loan; the one year passage of time; and no
further amendments to the Operating Agreement. See R. 221, <|j C; R. 522-528. See also
CCD Brief at 6 (acknowledging that the parties agreed "that if Millsap timely repaid the
Newman Loan, and the Operating agreement was not thereafter modified within a year
after repayment of the loan . . . the terms of the Operating Agreement shall thereafter be
binding upon the parties"); CCD Brief at 22 (noting the three conditions that were
required). There has been no argument by CCD that these three conditions precedent
were not met.
Instead, CCD argues that other provisions of the Amendment were material,
including the agreement that Millsap had no authority to sign checks and withdraw funds
from CCD's trust account. See CCD Brief at 22, 27.8 CCD then reasons that Millsap's
continued check writing and use of the trust account constitute "material" breaches of the
Amendment. See CCD Brief at 21-23, 28-29; 43-45. Millsap makes the following
responses.
First, as noted before the district court and in the initial Brief of the Appellant, the
realities of the business required Millsap to write hundreds of checks from the trust

8

CCD also asserts that it reserved any claims it had against Millsap in law or
equity. See CCD Brief at 22. However, even though the right may have been "reserved,"
a party cannot enter a new contract which, if fulfilled, will purportedly satisfy an
obligation, and then, once that obligation has been met, seek, as in this case, expulsion.
While CCD and its Members may have attempted to reserve such right, CCD and its
Members must still seek enforcement of such right in a timely manner.
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account for legitimate business purposes after the Amendment was signed. All checks
were written with the complete knowledge and approval of his partners. See R. 478, ^ 11;
R. 488-489; R. 525-526; 531-532. CCD and its Members cannot allow and authorize an
action and then later complain that it constitutes breach.
Second, Millsap has admitted to wrongfully writing two additional checks for his
personal use which were made known to the Members immediately, the funds were
immediately repaid, and Millsap was consequently terminated as an employee.9 Despite
CCD's contention that it was unaware of such use, CCD itself recognizes its knowledge.
See CCD Brief at 14-15 (noting that Newman investigated and then terminated Millsap);
id. at 30 (admitting knowledge of Millsap's acts). Importantly, after discovering the two
instances of misuse after the Amendment was signed, CCD and its Members continued to
act according to the terms of the Amendment. Rather than terminating Millsap as an
employee as they did, CCD and its Members could have moved to expel Millsap at that
time. Additionally, CCD and its Members could have easily further amended the
Operating Agreement, which was a material condition to the Amendment, in order to
terminate Millsap's rights. None of this occurred. CCD continually glosses over the fact
that not until at least a year went by and not until Millsap fulfilled all the material
conditions precedent necessary for Millsap to regain his rights, did CCD seek expulsion.
This Court should find that such untimely action on the part of CCD waived any assumed

9

The termination of Millsap as an employee did not affect his status as a
"member."
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right to refuse performance of the Amendment or right to expel.
Finally, CCD fails to distinguish the difference between the clear "conditions
precedent" of the Amendment which, if met, allowed Millsap to regain his rights of
membership, and certain promises included within the Amendment that were arguably
either disregarded by all parties involved or not kept. As noted in the initial Brief of
Appellant, "A promise is a manifestation of an intention to act or refrain from acting in a
specified way, so made as to justify the promisee in understanding that a commitment has
been made, while a condition is an event, not certain to occur, which must occur...
before performance under a contract becomes due." See Brief of Appellant at 38, n.22
(citing 13 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 38:5 (4th ed. 2000), at
382) (emphasis added). The difference in the legal effect of the two concepts is
important. Indeed, when "conditions precedent" have been fulfilled, then the opposing
party is required to act accordingly. See id. Failure to uphold a "promise," on the other
hand, may subject the promisor to liability for damages, but performance under the
contract is not necessarily excused. See id. In this case, CCD never asserts that Millsap
failed to meet the three conditions precedent required of him to regain his rightsincluding his right to retire. This Court should therefore not allow CCD to refuse
performance of the Amendment.10
l0

According to plain language of the four corners of the contract, the only three
conditions for Millsap to meet in order to regain his memberships rights did not include
the check-writing provision. As noted in prior briefing, the main purpose of the contract
was secure repayment of the misused funds in an expedited manner. That goal was
accomplished. However, if this Court looks beyond the clear words of the contract, and
18

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and the argument and authority set forth in the initial Brief
of Appellant, this Court should find that Millsap properly retired as a Member of CCD.
As such, this Court should find that based on this retirement, Millsap was no longer a
"member" of CCD as contemplated by statute, and therefore as a matter of law, may not
be judicially expelled.

DATED this

/

day of October 2002.

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
ANN MARIE TALIAFERRO
Attorneys for Appellant Millsap
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attempts to determine the intent of the parties in drafting the check writing provision and
its "materiality," then the issue raises disputed issues of material fact which makes
summary judgment inappropriate.
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